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Justice, Mercy, and Craziness 
Stephen J. Tvforse* 
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw. By Norval M orris . Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press . 1982. ix + 235 p p .  $20.00. 
In i\dadness and the Criminal Law, Norval M orris addresses the 
vexing legal problems crea ted by the interaction between mental 
dis order and criminal behavior .  Us ing short s tories in the mode 
of the early George Orwel l ,  and s tandard legal analys is ,  Professor 
M orris artfully considers the relationship between legal and 
moral guil t ,  the insanity defens e ,  the relevance of mental disor­
der to sentencing, the role of m ercy in punishment , and whether 
the criminal j us tice sys tem should treat l ike cases alike. The book 
is  charming, humane, and often elegant .  Profes sor Morris usu­
ally, but regre ttably no t always , recognizes when his expos ition 
requires an argument rather than simply a conclusion. 
I agree with Professor M orris on many matters . For example, 
w e  share an admiration for Orwell and a distaste for current com­
p etence- to-s tand-trial procedures ,  sexual psychopathy laws,  con­
fusing diminished capacity doctrines,  and the gui l ty but mentally 
i l l  verdict.  Nevertheles s ,  we dis agree about many important is­
sues ,  such as  the need to maintain the insanity defense, the role 
of desert in sentencing, and the function of m ental abnormality 
in a ttributing blame and apportioning punishment. In this re­
view, I shall try to identify the sources of our disputes and the 
problems Professor Morris does not resolve despite the erudition 
and vigor of his arguments . 
J. THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
Professor Morris rej ects using a hybrid of the mental health 
and criminal j us tice systems to respond to criminal behavior.  He 
b elieves that hybrid s  produce both inj u s tice and practical conse-
* Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral 
Sciences,  University of Southern California. A.B. 1 966, Tufts; J.D. 1 970, Ph.D.  1 973 ,  
Harvard University. 
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quences worse than those produced by either system functioning 
alone. Professor Morris '  solution is to treat criminal l a w  viola­
tions solely within the criminal j u s tice sys tem. Thu s ,  c ompe­
tence-to-stand- trial pro ceedings would be radically a l tered to 
p ermit all  offenders to come t o  trial quickly. 1 More radical yet ,  
Professor Morris would abo lish the insanity defense . 2  M ental 
dis order would be consid ered a t  trial only ins ofar as  it negated 
mens rea, and at  sentencing. Alt hough Professor M orris i s  a 
l eading and sophisticated advocate for the abolitionis t p o s i tion, I 
b elieve he is nonetheless mis taken according to his own theoreti­
cal s tandards.  
Let us consider our points of agreement firs t, however.  Pro­
fessor M orris correctly notes tha t  while the ins ani ty d efense is 
raised in very few cases , the amount of time and res o u rces it re­
quires and the concern it generates are grossly disprop o rt ionate 
t o  its importance.3 The result o f  a successful insani ty p lea-usu­
ally commitment to a maximum s ecurity state hospital for the 
criminally insane-is often less therapeu tic and pleas ant  than a 
prison s entence. M o reover, some defendants may not r ai s e  the 
insanity defense or succeed at it when they shoul d ,  whil e  o thers 
who should be convicted and punished win acquittal .  Further­
m ore, many disordered pris oners who did not rais e i t  (or did not 
d o  s o  successfully) , but who need treatment, do not receive i t .  I 
agree,  in short, that there are many practical problems , s o m e  o f  
which abolition would remedy . 
But even if abolition is practical , is i t  j u s t ?  Thi s  i s  a fair  ques­
t ion to ask o f  Professor M o rris b ecause he emplo ys a theo ry o f  
criminal s anctions that considers just  deserts as w e l l  as  c ons e-
I.  Pp. 44-53 .  I substantially agree with this proposal. More injus tice is done 
under the current slow and psychiatrically unjustified incompetence procedures than 
would be created by trying incompetent defendants. 
2. Although the Hinckley verdict has made it fashionable to propose abolishing the 
insanity defense, Professor Morris had suggested abolition long before that event .  N .  
MoRRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HoNEST PoLITICIAN's GuiDE TO CRIME CoNTROL 176-85 
(1970); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 4 1  S. CAL. L. REV. 5 1 4 ,  516-28 
(1968). 
3. As a practical matter, if a jurisdiction adopted both a reasonable partial-respon­
sibility variant of diminished capacity that applied to all crimes, and a fair and workable 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, an insanity defense would be necessary in very few 
cases. Nevertheless ,  as I shall argue below, the insanity defense si10uld be retained for 
moral reasons, even if i t  applies to very few cases. I also believe that a partial-responsi­
bility defense is unwise, see Morse, Undzminished Confusion in Dimmished Capacity, 75 J. 
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 28-36 ( 1 984) ,  and that a fair and workable indeterminate 
sentencing scheme is impossible, see notes 24-59 infra and accompanying text. 
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quentialist resul ts .  Indeed , he directly confronts "the question o f  
fairness, the sense tha t i t  i s  unjust and unfair t o  stigmatize the 
mentally i l l  as criminals and to punish them for their crimes,"-! 
but the argument that abolition is j ust fails. 
To understand why, we must first briefly address the moral 
foundations of the insanity defense . It is based on general princi­
ples of excuse that our society considers fundamental . The pre­
conditions for resp onsibi lity for actions are tha t an actor b e  
minimal ly  ratio nal ( a  cogni tive capaci ty) and minimally capable o f  
self-control (a volit ional capaci ty) . For example, infants and 
some demented persons are not thought to b e  morall y  guilty for 
the harms they cause precisely because they lack these capaci­
ties . 5  Similarly, an adult who causes a harm while  distraught be­
cause of a personal tragedy wi l l  typically be considered l ess 
responsible than if he or she had been rati onal and in contro l .  
Criminal l aw defenses concerned wi th the defendant's conduct 
are based on the same principles. We excuse a defendant whose 
acts were the product of cognitive (e . g . ,  infancy) or volit ional 
(e . g . ,  duress) circumstances that were not his fault . 6  
The question, then, is whether in some cases extreme crazi­
ness at  the time of the offense so compromises the defendant's 
rationality or self-control that i t  would be unjust to hold him or 
her responsible .  Professor M orris admits that there " is indeed 
some quite florid psychopathology [i.e,, crazy behavior] . . .  
among those for whom these pleas are made . . .  "7  and that i t  
would be unj ust not  to mitigate their punishment,8 b ecause, I 
presume, they are l ess responsible.  These admissions concede 
that craziness can affect one' s  cognitive and volitional capacities 
for responsibility.  If craziness can mitigate responsibility,  why 
should it not excuse the defendant altogether in an extreme 
:::ase ? On what theory of responsibility can we hol d  accountable 
che small number o f  persons who offend under the influence of 
�xtreme craziness ?9 
4 .  P. 6 1 .  
5 .  We may restrain such persons to prevent them from causing harm in the future, 
>ut we would not consider such restraint punishment that has been imposed because it 
s deserved. 
6. This view of human responsibility for action traces its long history at least back 
o Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, The Nichomachean Ethics, bk. III, ch. I in INTRODUCTION TO 
I.RTISTOTLE 338, 385-90 (2d rev. ed. 1973). 
7. P. 83. 
8. Pp.  146-60. 
9. It is possible, of course, that Professor Morris might concede that al though era-
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Professor Morris argues that it  is just to hold mentally disor­
dered persons responsible for their actions because they have 
sufficient freedom to choose their behavior. 10 His argument is 
that other causes of crime, such as social disadvantage, are far 
more criminogenic than mental disorder (including severe disor­
der), yet we do not excuse those who are poor or the products of 
broken homes. Why, then, should \ve excuse the mentally disor­
dered?1 1 Professor Morris concludes that "[a]s a rational matter, 
it is hard to see why one should be more responsible for what is 
done to one than for what one is." 1 2  This conclusion is surely 
correct, but it does not follow from its premise, which is based on 
morally irrelevant comparisons between disadvantaged and crazy 
persons. 
Professor Morris confuses causation with excuse, a mistake 
about responsibility that has consistently bedeviled criminal law 
theorists. But causation is not an excuse, for, presumably, all be­
havior is caused. If causation were an excuse, no one would be 
held responsible for any behavior, criminal or otherwise.13 
Moreover, causation is not the equivalent of the subspecies of 
excuse that we may term compulsion. 14 Compulsion occurs 
ziness can diminish responsibility somewhat, it can never do so entirely. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to imagine what moral argument would support holding responsible a de­
fendant who is wildly out of touch with reality at the time of the offense. Professor 
Morris does not provide such an argument. Moreover, he would excuse entirely a per­
son grossly out of touch wilh reality as a result of involuntary intoxication. 
I 0. The locution "freedom of choice" is Professor Morris'. P. 61. I find such locu­
tions, including those that refer to free will or its absence, as conclusory or confusing. 
Although much of the insanity defense debate is expressed in terms of free choice and 
similar phrases, I am never sure what freedom of choice means. How does it relate to 
compulsion or theoretical conceptualizations of determinism) Determinism does not 
entail a finding of compulsion or absence of choice. 
II. P. 63. 
12 . !d. 
1 3. I am arguing here for the position in philosophy known as "compatibilism," 
1.e., that determinism does not negate individual responsibility. See A. KENNY, FREE 
WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY 22-45 (1978); A. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
EsSAYS ( 1963) . For a discussion of these issues in a related context, see Morse, Failed 
Explanatwns and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971, 
I 027-30, 1033-37 ( 1982) .  To use the terminology in Failed Explanations. Professor Mor­
ris is a "selective determinist" or a "selective compulsivist"; that is, he believes that only 
some people are determined. Moreover, his position identifies him as a "partial incom­
patibilist"-one who believes that determinism and responsibility are antithetical in 
those cases where the person's behavior is caused. This position is theoretically inca­
herem, however. See Moore, Detenninism and the Excuses, _CALIF. L. REv. _ (forthcom­
ing, 1 985) 
14. See sources cited in note 13 supra . 
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when the p erson faces a regrettable hard choice that leaves him 
no reas onable al ternative to wrongdoing. C l early, if caus ation 
were compuls ion , no one would b e  responsible  for his acts b e­
cause a l l  b ehavior is caused and thus all  would be compelled.  
B u t  causation is n o t  the iss ue: Nonculpable lack of rationality 
or s elf-con trol i s .  Professor Morri s '  conclus ion that a person 
should not be more reponsible for what is done to him than fo r 
what he is does indeed follow from this premise .  Consider the 
case of a person whose extreme irra tionali ty is  the product of 
havin g involuntarily,  unknowingly ingested a powerful halluci­
nogen . The law holds , and Professor M o rris agrees , that this de­
fendan t, who is n o t  respons ible for what has b een done to him,  is 
not responsible for his consequent crime. If this i s  corre c t ,  as 
Professor M o rris argues ,  h o w  can we distinguish the case of a 
person who commits a crime in response t o  mo tivations pro­
duced by a severe mental dis o rder, say,  a sudden command hal­
l ucination b u t tres sed by a consistent delusional b elief that the 
action is  necessary ? 1 5  If i t  is proper to excuse an involun tarily 
drug-in toxicated person, a crazy defendant,  who is  similarly n o t  
responsible for what he i s ,  should a l s o  be excused.  The deluded 
defendant is  also the "victim" of his  disorder, which has " done 
something" to him.  In both cases the defendant is excused not  
b ecause the behavior is  caused,  but b ecause the defendant was 
s ufficiently irrational and n o t  responsible for the irrationality.  
The reason we do not excuse most disadvantaged criminals 
(or o ther p ersons whose criminality can be causally explained) is  
not our lack of sympathy for their unfortunate backgrounds,  or 
our failure to recognize that.  s o cial disadvantage is a powerful 
cause of crime, as surely i t  i s .  16 Rather, we hold most disadvan­
taged defendan ts responsible b ecause they pos sess minimal ra­
tionality and self-contro l .  A disadvantaged defendant " driven 
crazy" by his l ife circumstances will be excused becaus e  he is 
crazy,  not b ecause he is  disadvantaged or b ecause his behavior 
was caus ed.  Similarly ,  most mentally diso rdered persons are 
1 5 . The hypothetical assumes that the deluded defendant was unable to take steps 
in advance to control his irrationality. Cf People v .  Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 1 33, 1 38 N . E .2d 
799,  1 57 N .Y.S.2d 558 ( 1 956) (automobile driver had epileptic seizure and killed 
pedestrian) . 
1 6 .  See Cantwell ,  The Offender, in U.S .  DEP'T OF juSTICE,  REPORT TO THE NATION ON 
CRIME AND juSTICE 29, 36-38 ( 1 983) .  See generally G. NETTLER, ExPLAINING CRIME 
1 28-62 (2d ed . 1 978) (describing the inverse correlation between social advantage and 
crime rates, but questioning some of the usual in terpretations of these data). 
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held res ponsible for acts influen ced by their disorder because,  
despite i t ,  they are  sufficien tly in con trol and ra tional to meet  the 
low,  threshold standards for responsibility . 1 7  
If the defendant was extremely irra tional or o u t  o f  control a t  
t h e  time of t h e  offense,  we do w i s h  to know whether the defend­
an t was responsible for his or her incapacity. Th u s ,  a defendan t 
will  n o t  be entirely excused if his incapacity is d u e ,  for example,  
to his volun tary and kno win g inges tion of a s trong hallucin o gen 1 8 
or his failure to follow a pres cribed medical regimen . 1 9  But if the 
irrational i ty is  the product o f  extreme mental disorder, over 
which, to the best  o f  our knowledge ,  the person has l i t tl e  contro l ,  
then the p erson should b e  entirely excused.  
The mens rea approach that Professor Morris s ugges ts-us ­
ing evidence of men tal dis order solely to negate mens rea-is n o t  
a n  appropriate substitute for t h e  insanity defens e .  Even t h e  cra­
ziest  defendants ,  such as our hallucinating and deluded actor, 
usually have the m en s  rea req uired by the highest  cri m e  charged 
( they may ki l l  with premeditated intent, although for the crazie s t  
reasons) .20 Very few defendants ,  no matter how dis ordered , will  
ob tain conviction o f  a lesser offens e  and a reduced s en tence 
under the m ens rea approach.  Moreover, conviction of a lesser 
offens e  and reduction in sentence are insufficient responses t o  
t h e  clear inj us tice t h a t  convicting o bviously disordered defend­
ants will produce. On what adequate theory of desert can a 
grossly p sychotic defendant receive more than the m o s t  minimal 
penalty, if  any ? Punishing a defendant more than h e  deserves for 
fear o f  "depreciating the s eriousness o f  the offens e" abandons 
any contraints desert would provide. Undeserved punishment 
will surely o ccur, h owever, because severely crazy defendants 
convicted of the m o s t  s erious crimes must  be given relatively sub­
s tantial and thus disproportionately harsh p enalties t o  avoid the 
depreciation effect.  In addition, convicting and punishing 
nonresponsible defendants  will  create disrespect for the criminal 
law on fairness  grounds if  they are punished too harshly, o r  dis­
respect on consequen tial ist  grounds if they are n o t  punished 
1 7 .  See generally Monahan & Steadman, C1·ime and Mental Disorder: An Epidemiological 
Approach in 4 CRIME AND JusTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 45 ,  1 52-72 (M. 
Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1 983) (discussing the relationship, or lack thereof, between 
crime and mental disorder). 
1 8 .  See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2 .08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1 962). 
19. See Regina v. Quick, [ 1 953] 3 W.L.R. 26 (Crim.  App.). 
20. Morse, supra note 3 ,  at 38-44. 
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harshly enough . One can argue persuasively that even the crazi­
est persons should be held accountable for their actions b ecause 
they retain substantial ability to con trol their crazin ess and other 
behavior rela ted to it. 2 1 B u t  in the criminal j u s tice sys tem , where 
liberty and stigma are a t  s take, we should give the benefit of the 
doubt to very crazy persons by retaining the defens e .  
The insanity defens e must  be retained because i t  i s  unfair to  
punish actors unless they deserve it .  I t  i s  s imply not j u s t  to  con­
vict and punish retributively those who are fundamentally and 
nonculpably irra tional or  out of control. Jus tice requires that ef­
forts to abolish the defense should be redirected to reforming 
tho se aspects of it that Professor M orris , I, and others abhor. Ab­
olition will not  measurably improve the efficiency and honesty of 
the criminal j us tice system, nor will it lead to enhanced s ocial 
safety or the proper treatment of disordered inmates .  Rather, it 
is an admission of moral exhaustion that will lead to further dis­
respect fo r the view that persons must be treated as moral agents . 
I I .  SENTENCING POLICY, MENTAL DISORDER AND MERCY 
The bulk of A1adness and the Criminal Law, including one of the 
two s hort s tories that Professor Morris uses as illus trations ( " The 
Brothel Boy " ) ,  addres ses sentencing policy. As one who adop ts a 
theory of punishment that blends desert and consequen tialism ,  
Professor Morris claims that desert can b e  no more than a limit­
ing principle that sets a range of "no t  undeserved" punishments 
for each crime. Within that range, consequentialist  concerns will 
appropriately dictate the punishment in a p articular case. Profes­
sor M orris further believes that the defendant ' s  mental dis order 
may both mitigate and aggravate the gravity of the offense, thus 
giving grounds for decreas ing and increasing the sentence within 
the not undeserved range. M oreover, mercy must be exercised 
to temper jus tice, which M orris apparently equates with equality, 
les t  the s trict application of the law cause the greates t injury o f  
all. Finally, Professor Morris argues that the virtues of treating 
like cases alike are overrated.  Although he uses men tal disorder 
as  an example of how his s cheme would apply, his core concern is 
to argue for his theory of s en tencing and for the fairness of treat­
ing like cases unalike-what he calls "anisonomy . "  
2 1 .  See Morse, Crazy Behavior, !VI orals & Science: An Analysis of J'v!ental Health Law, 5 1  S .  
CAL. L. REV. 527,  564-89 ( 1 978).  
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This review is not the appropriate place to rehas h the ongo­
ing and often fervent debate about the theoretical and practi cal 
merits of various sen tencing policies . Ins tead , I wish to focus o n  
t h e  maj or arguments Professor M orris presents for u s i n g  indeter­
minate sentencing, for rej ecting the s trong norm of equality in 
sentencing, and for using men tal disorder and mercy to s e t  
proper sentences . There can be no perfect sentencing scheme, 
especially in a crimi nal j u s tice system as flawed as ours . N ever­
theles s ,  the moral and logical appeal of treating like cas es alike is 
so powerful that it takes enormously s trong arguments to j us tify 
n o t  d oing s o .  To what ex tent are we are will ing, on b o th theoret­
ical and practical grounds,  to treat persons as means to ends and 
to accept the exercise of discretio n ?  Professor M orris is  clearly 
n o t  a pure consequential ist  nor does he advocate unbridled dis­
cretion;  nevertheless ,  his sys tem comes perilously close to a con­
sequential ist  and arbitrary scheme .22 
In the remainder of this review, I wil l  suggest  that Professor 
M orris provides insufficient j u s tifications for (1) the general 
mixed theory of sentencing that leads to unequal sentences for 
defendants convicted of the same crime, and (2) the u s e  o f  
mental disorder and mercy to s e t  sen tences i n  individual cas es . 
I n s tead , I propose that better definitions of crimes and defenses,  
coupled with reasonable,  determinate sentences , wil l  create a 
more j ust ,  al though by no means perfect,  sys tem.23 To demon­
s trate the validity of this  contention,  I shall conclude w i th a re­
analysis  of "The Bro thel Boy , "  the moral tale that Professor 
M o rris uses to prove the necessity for exercising discretion and 
mercy in sentencing. 
22. As Professor Morris makes clear throughout the book, desert must  play an im­
portant role in sentencing. Moreover, in an earlier discussion of sentencing policy using 
Rawls' "veil of ignorance" methodology, Morris wrote that "we should . . .  subscribe to 
concepts of fairness and justice that preclude the sacrifice of the individual prisoner to a 
supposed larger social good . "  N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 ( 1 974). 
These are the right sentiments, but they seem quite inconsistent with the system Profes­
sor Morris now proposes. 
23. I should make i t  clear at the outset that I have no utopian expectations of a 
determinate sentencing scheme. As many critics have argued, determinate sentencing 
has a mul titude of practical and theoretical problems .  See, e.g., J .  HEWITT & T. CLEAR, 
THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM: FROM INDETERMINATE TO DETERMINATE SENTENC­
ING ( 1 983) . Nor do I consider indeterminate sentencing incoherent. I simply believe 
that a determinate scheme, despite its problems, will operate more fairly and efficiently. 
\ 
·• 
t 
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A. Sentencing Policy 
The analysis in J\1/adness and the CriminaL Law is so mewhat dis­
cursive, perhaps reflecting the book's  provenance as a series of 
writings o n  related themes .�4 The book provides no si ngle, sys­
tematic s tatement o f  Morris' argument for employing ran ges of 
sen tences and rej ecting equali ty. Neverth eles s ,  I believe that 
Professor Morris' arg·ument rests on three related propos it ions ,  
each being necessary and to gether all  being sufficient to prove 
the superiority o f his sugges ted s cheme. Firs t ,  desert cannot be a 
defining principle o f  punishment because i t  i s  too indetermi nate.  
I n  o ther words, i t  i s  imp o s s ible to claim coherently that there i s  a 
specific deserved punis hment for each criminal offens e . 25 Sec­
o nd, no one reall y  believes in  equality of sen tencing anyway, be­
cause we al l  accept numerous importan t exceptions to equali ty .26 
Third, parsimonious sentencing should and can be performed . 
That is ,  s ociety should impose the l eas t amount o f  suffering con­
s i s tent with achieving our o th er,  cons equential ist  social goals i n  
punishing,  a goal that i s  practically possible a s  well  a s  j u s t .27 Let 
us cons i der each o f  these contentions in  order.28 
First ,  Professor Morris makes the s tandard argument against  
accepting desert as a defining p rinciple that  y ields  a fixed punish­
ment for each o ffens e.29 H e  n o tes that  the usual yards t icks , s uch 
as the talionic law, or notions o f  paying the perpetrator back for 
the pain caused t o  the victim o r  society, fai l  as guides to punish­
ment ,  and that ideas o f  just  deserts are relative to t ime and 
p lace.30 He i s  quite righ t .  Few sophis ticated pers ons would 
claim that  there i s  an invariant ,  obj ective deserved punishment 
fo r each o ffensive act .  But desert  theoris ts only need t o  make a 
m ore modest claim: I t  is poss ible  in  any s ociety to rank the seri-
24 . Professor Morris developed many of the arguments in his previous articles and 
books . See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 22; Morris ,  The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a 
Punitive Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1 16 1  ( 1 974); Morris, supra note 2; Burt & Morris, A 
Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI.  L. REv. 66 (1972) . Chapters 2, 
4, and 5 of Madness and the Criminal Law modify and expand his previous arguments and 
provide new material. 
25 .  Pp. 148-50, 196-202. 
26 .  Pp . 187-92. 
27 .  Pp. 148-50, 189-96. 
28. Morris also claims that we must allow room for mercy because an absolutely 
evenhanded system would be harsher than our present arrangements. Pp.ISS-60. I 
shall consider this argument later. See notes 72-78 infra and accompanying text. 
29.  I shall hereafter refer to this as the "pure desert" or "desert" theory. 
30. Pp . 1 49-50 . 
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ousness o f  criminal o ffens es and to ass ign to each a punishment 
that the s o ciety at  that t ime consi ders proportional  t o  the s erious­
ness o f  the offen s e . 3 1 This i s  then the deserve d  punishment at  
that time and in that place.  32  I f  Professor Morris  wishes to call  a 
res ulting punishment " n o t  undeserved, "  thus reflecting the lack 
of obj ective morality i n  sett ing punishments , so b e  it .  I am n o t  
offended by such a pro cedure b ecause it  i s  n o  more arbitrary 
than the infinite l ine drawings in which the law cons tantly 
engages. 
Second,  Professor M o rris supports his assault  on equali ty i n  
punishment by noting t h a t  everyone already accep ts excep tions 
t o  equal i ty such as exemplary punishments,  pardo n  and amnesty 
(for conditions o th er than later-proved innocen c e) , and s el ec tive 
enforcemen t.33  Empirically, h o wever, everyon e  d o es not accept 
s uch excep tions . Firs t, I ,  for one, do n o t  agree o n  the need or 
j ustification for such excep tions and would not allow them . Sec­
ond,  i t  i s  curious and illogical morally to claim that b ecaus e a 
p ractice does exist ,  i t  should exi s t .  Third, there are p roblems 
with each o f  these exceptions on the meri t s .  For example,  
although i t  i s  impossible ever to treat p ersons p er fe c tly as  ends , i t  
i s  particularly unfair  t o  u s e  a p erson a s  a means b y  punishing h i m  
more harshly than s imilar offenders s imply to s e t  a n  exam p l e .  I f  
one is  a des ert theori s t ,  i t  offends the sense o f  justice t o  p u n i s h  
someone n o t  for w h a t  h e  h a s  d o n e ,  b u t  for t h e  greater good,  the 
increased deterrence that will supposedly result .  M oreover, i t  is  
by no means certain that treating people in this w ay will produce 
a net  social b en efit .34 A similar analysis also applies t o  the pro­
priety o f  amnesty and pardon .  
3 1. For instance, a survey by "[t)he National Survey of Crime  Severity found that 
many diverse groups of people agree about the relative severity of specific crimes ."  
Rand, Klaus, & Taylor, The Criminal Event, in U.S. DEP'T O F  JusTICE, supra note 1 6, a t  4 .  
There were some differences in how people rated the severity of  various crimes-for 
example, crime victims assigned ·generally higher "severity scores" than non-victims­
but people by and large agreed upon rankings. !d. For a retribution-based procedure 
for setting penalties, see Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726, 
736-42 ( 1983). 
32. The Supreme Court has recognized that principles of federalism and varying 
state interests can produce wide and constitutionally permissible differences between 
severity rankings and assigned punishments for crimes among the states . Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 ( 1983); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 2 84 ( 1 980) . 
33 .  Pp. 187-92. 
34. As Holmes noted, for example, society uses soldiers as a means to an end. 
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAw 43 ( 1 88 1) .  But the soldiers ' dignity is not unduly 
offended because most people would agree to the need to have one's country defended. 
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Finally, the exercise  of dis cretion produced by selective en­
forcement may be an inevitable evi l  of  our criminal j ustice sys­
tem, but I see no reason not to avoid i t  i n  s en tencing.  I should 
try dras tical ly to l imit selective enforcement at all l evels of the 
system if the resources are availab le .  It is of course true,  as critics 
of de terminate s en tencing contend, that el iminating dis cretion at 
sentencing wi l l  not eliminate it at earlier points in the sys tem .35 
Nevertheles s ,  Professor Morri s '  view of the criminal j us tice sys­
tem as a closed hydraulic mo del-wh ere discretion closed off in 
on e place mu st  i nevi tably  resurface elsewhere- is unlikely to be 
correct .36 Nor is i t  l ikely that the appearance of equal i ty in deter­
minate s en tencing wil l  lul l  anyone into b elieving that mas sive 
amounts of arbitrary and unfair discretion no longer exist  else­
where in the system. M o s t  important ,  i t  i s  fairer b o th to treat like 
cas es alike and not to use persons as means to ends .37  
Professor M orri s '  final and most  imp ortan t p roposit ion sup­
porting inequality is  that parsimonious s en tencing is b o th j ust  
and practical . This theory has undeniable appeal b ecau s e  i t  
s eems t o  provide t h e  b e s t  of b o t h  worlds-offenders g e t  what 
they deserve ,  but only up to the amount necessary to achieve 
other worthy social ends .  To implemen t his theory, Professor 
Morris proposes using a range of sentences that can b e  imposed 
for each crime.  A ran ge gives deserts  their due by allowing for 
adjustments in  punishment necess i tated by the extraordinary di­
versity of factors , such as mental disorder, that can affect criminal 
b ehavior but that legislative definitions cannot p os sibly cover. I t  
simultaneously allows for the realization of consequentialis t  goals 
such as maximizing deterrence. Moreover, a range permits the 
granting of mercy,  which humanizes punishment and enri ches 
the soul of the person dispensing it .  Although the case for such a 
By contrast, few would agree to being punished more harshly because unequal punish­
ment would infringe upon their dignity and result in indeterminate social benefits. 
35. See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Refonn and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent 
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 1 26 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978) .  
36. See id. at 577.  
37 .  By "like cases ,"  I mean cases that are legally alike in fitting the same category 
of criminal liability. Cases that are factually alike may of course be treated legally differ­
ently through the exercise of discretion at any stage of the system. In my view, this is an 
abuse that we should try to correct: Cases that are factually alike ought to be treated 
legally alike. At present, however, we have the worst of all worlds-too much arbitrary 
exercise of discretion at every stage. 
1496 STANFORD Ul W REVIEH' [Vol. 36 :148 5 
sensible scheme seems unassai lable, 38 fo r both th e o retical  and 
p ractical reasons the system would be more unj ust  and arb itrary 
than a more determinate scheme, and it would not guaran tee that 
good consequences would flow from the "fme-tuning" it  suppos­
edly al lows.  We shal l  firs t see why Profes sor Morris' sys tem of 
parsimonious,  dis creti onary sen tencing is  unfair and then turn to 
an examination o f  why i t  i s  impractical . 
The primary objection to the system i s  that i t  is unfair: Per­
sons convicted of the same crime receive unequal punishments 
either for reas ons that have nothing to do with their crime (gen­
eral deterrence, for example) or because o f  mitigat ing o r  a ggra­
vating factors that lack persuasive j u s t i fication and canno t  be 
applied nonarbitrarily .  Punishing unequally to achieve s o ci a l  
goals uses defendants as means to a n  end, without respect for 
their dignity.  Although the demands o f  equal j us t ice may be 
"hazy, "39 it i s  insufficient simply to assert that one can distin­
gui s h  between a general j u s tification for punis hmen t and the j us ­
tification for i ts  distribution i n  individual cases .40 O ne s ti l l  must  
demons trate that  i t  is  accep table to treat persons as means i n  in­
dividual cases because desert sets fair  minimal cons traints  o n  do­
i n g  s o  i n  general . Profess o r  M o rris tries to p rove this  b y  claiming 
that his  sys tem would n o t  treat defendants without regard to de­
sert s ince no one would receive an undeserved punishment .  This 
resp o nse does not s ucceed, as we shall  see, because desert does 
n o t  l o gically entail  a range rather than a fixed sentence, and be­
cause moral ly important differences in desert cann o t  be n onarbi­
traril y  dis tinguished among offenders to whom the range 
38 .  Professor Morris consistently refers to indeterminate systems as "mature," in 
contras t, it  would appear, to allegedly " immature" desert systems. 
39 .  Pp. 1 80-8 1 .  Here Professor Morris is relying on H .L.A. Hart's use of the term 
" hazy ."  See H .L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 24 ( 1 968) . 
40.  Here, again, Professor Morris relies heavily on a distinction Professor Hart 
draws most influentially. Hart, supra note 39, at 8- 1 3 . As Professor Morris fears quib­
bling with Aristotle (who believed that justice required that like cases be treated alike), 
P. 1 80, I fear quibbling with Professor Hart. Nevertheless , distinguishing between the 
general justification for punishment and the justification for its distribution seems to me 
rather hazy. I f  a general justifying principle of punishment exists,  then the treatment of 
individual cases should be derived from it. I f  both the supposed general j us tifying aim 
(desert) and the distributive aim (utility) are to be considered in every case, I do not 
understand how this differs from the usual sort of mixed theory. But see G. FLETCHER, 
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 4 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 978) . Professor Hart's distinction does not allow 
the criminal justice theorist who proposes the mixed view to avoid having to justify his 
position. 
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allegedly appl i e s .  Defendants will n o t  get their just  des erts, and 
consequential  concerns will  p redominate . 
The criticism o f  indeterminacy that Professor M orris aims a t  
determi nate sentencing can b e  leveled fairly a t  h i s  schem e a s  
well, for u n d e r  h i s  scheme desert s e t s  a n  upper maximum (be­
:.und v;hich punishment is too s evere) and a 10\ver minimum (be­
neath which punishment is too l enient,  thus depreciating the 
seriousness of  the of-Tense) .41 Professor  Morris claims that since 
even the most  well-defined crimes cover diverse types of b ehav­
ior, only a range of not undes erved punis hments can really en­
com pass the just  desert in  a given case . . 12 A hierarchy of n o t  
undeserved puni shments w i l l  thus b e  a hi erarchy o f  ran ges o f  
punishments . 
The problem, as M o rris concedes, is that there are no firm 
cri teria for setting the ranges o f  punishments .43 Because there 
can be no obj ectively correc t  penal ty for m o s t  crimes that is 
"too" severe, there will be l i t tl e  cons traint on legislative j udg­
men t in s etting the high end of the ran ge . Moreover, if desert 
can vary within a range in propo rtion to the responsibi l i ty o f  the 
offen der, i t  i s  difficult  to unders tand why there s hould ever b e  a 
minimum penalty for any crime .44 Imagine the case of a gro s s l y  
psychotic defendant w h o  w o u l d  m e e t  a n y  l e gal  tes t for insanity, 
b u t  under Professor Morri s '  scheme must  be held responsible for 
the crime he committed.  Such a perso n  would b e  barely respon­
sible, even according to M orri s ,  and o n e  wonders why i t  would 
depreciate the s eriousness o f  any o ffense, no matter how hei­
nous,  to as s ert that this  pers o n  deserves l i t t le  i f  any punishme n t .  
Everyone agrees t h a t  murder i s  dreadful, but  I d o u b t  t h a t  many 
people would consider it  less  dreadful  i f  a grossly psycho tic p e r­
son with the mens rea for murder were incarcerated o n  grounds 
o f  s a fety and therapy rather than desert .  The range of punish­
ments for each crime may b e  s o  wide that  desert will  p lay l i t tl e  
role, the opportunity for discretion wil l  b e  enormous, and conse­
quentialist  goals wil l  b e  the p rimary determinants o f  s entenc-
41. P. 198. 
42 . Pp. 1 50-52.  
43.  Pp. 1 5 1-52.  
44. I t  is easier to understand why desert would set  a maximum penalty: We believe 
with few exceptions that people do not deserve punishment that is disproportionately 
greater than the harm intended or risked, no matter how responsible and malevolent the 
actor might have been. 
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in g.45 Profes sor Morris evidently does not wish to go qu ite s o  
far, b u t  he is unable t o  provide a solution to th e pro blem. 
The same values and p o l i tical pro cesses that can set  a fixed 
range of punishmen ts for each crime can also set a fix e d  punish­
ment for each crime.  B ecause sett ing ei ther a fix ed am oun t or a 
range is a culturally relative outcome o f  a p articular p oli tical pro­
cess, indeterminancy pro b l ems exist  in both ca ses . The range 
and any punis hment within it wil l  be as arbi trary as a fixed sen­
tence. In one sense, of course,  a range is more likely to capture 
the " correct" punishment than a fixed term, but this is so only if 
we foolishly believe that an obj ectively correct sanction exis ts .  
In  addition , Professor M orris implicitly assumes that defend­
ants convicted o f  the same crime are more morally differen t  than 
alike and therefore i t  would b e  u nwise to punish them alike.  But 
con trary to his assumpti o n ,  claims for mi tigation and a ggravation 
of penalties on moral culpability grounds are primarily based on 
a desire for isonomy rather than anisonomy.  The primary moral 
reason to adjust sentences wi thin a range is to fit p unishment 
more precisely to desert than a determinate sys te m  would per­
mit .  While this is a j u s tifiable goal, it can succeed o n ly if  mora l  
differences between offenders convicted o f  the sam e  crime can 
accurately identify those differences_ and thus provide a nonarbi ­
trary basis for differential  p unishment.  But Professor M orris' ar­
gument does not  sufficiently support the existence of such 
differences or the p ossibi l i ty of employing them nonarb i trarily. 
All people have different  endowments,  histories, problems, 
p ersonalities, and so on. For purposes o f legal punish m en t ,  how­
ever, there is a sense in which al l  these differences are trivia l .  
When consi dering the criminal 's resp o nsib il ity,  we usually focus 
on all his problems,  all the criminogenic reasons why o b eying the 
law seemed so hard for him,  and why offending the law seemed 
so inevitabl e .  But suppose we ask the question in reverse: H o w  
h ard i s  i t  n o t  to offend t h e  l a w ?  The criminal l a w  sets very l o w  
standards; i t  asks very l i t t l e  of us. Further, a sensibl e  and careful 
definition of substan tive crimes and defenses can take important 
m oral differences into account.  Differences in  rationality and 
myriad o ther fac tors affect  whether a person offends o r  o beys the 
law.  But except in  extreme cases j ustifying a total  d e fense such 
as insanity,  duress, necessity ,  or s el f-defense,  i t  is s imply not that 
45 .  Pp. 1 52, 202 -05.  
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hard to obey.46 Neither this s ort of empirical claim nor its  oppo­
site i s  provable,  but  I believe my claim i s  more plausible .  I f  so,  all  
those defen dan ts who do not warran t  a ful l  excus e  may b e  far 
more alike than they are differen t .  The great value o f  this as­
s umption is  that  i t  treats people >vith respect and dign i ty rather 
than as h elpless puppets buffe ted by forces that rob them of re­
sponsib ility for their deeds . S t .  Peter may wish to do greater 
" fine tuning, " but the law should n o t .  
Ano ther w a y  of capturi n g  this in tuition u s e s  t h e  s o r t  o f  " light­
hearted psychologi cal reflection s "  Profes sor Morris employs .4 7 
He assures us  that pris o ners , who he claims are more sensible 
than his  Chicago Law School colleagues , would o bj ect to dispa­
rate sentence s ,  but that they would readily a gree that a t  least they 
are all getting what they deserve.48 Suppose we tell  those wise 
ci tizen-prisoners \vho received the higher s en tences that  the rea­
son the o thers received lesser terms for the same crime was that 
the o thers were "less together" men tally b ecause their past histo­
ries were tougher.49 My gues s  is  that they would react very un­
pleasantly.  Ins tead of " s ensibly" and good- naturedly a greein g  
that,  "Well ,  that 's  a good reaso n , "  m y  lighthearted reflective pre­
diction i s  that, outraged , they would swear profusely and claim 
that " Everyone's  go t a s tory , "  b ecause, in fact ,  everyone has . 
There is simply no defendant,  no matter how privileged, for 
whom a convincingly sad tale cannot be told .50 The heavily pun­
ished prisoners would say that they deserve the same punishment 
as  others who committed the same crime.  They are righ t :  The 
s trong norm o f  equality should n o t  yield to the common and dig­
nity-robbing assumption that differences i n  responsibility among 
the responsible are s o  great.  
Professor Morris is uneasy about punishing those who de­
s erve to be punished. He is constantly s eeking,  on b o th conse­
quential is t  and desert grounds,  means to avoid punishing. We 
agree that no one should suffer for n o thing, but causing people 
46 .  See a ls o  G .  FLETCHER, supra note 40 ,  a t  5 1 3- 1 4 .  The discussion i n  the  text i s  
presented in expanded form in  Morse, supra note 3 ,  a t  30-36. 
47 .  P. 20 1 .  
48 .  For prisoners, the problem is that all of their peers are not being punished 
equally. Morris contends, however, that prisoners will agree that justice does not re­
quire equality of punishment. !d. 
49. If this seems too colloquial, let me suggest that it is every bit as scientific as 
what could be claimed with more technical language. 
50. For a full discussion of this point in the context of using psychodynamic formu­
lations to tell the mitigating story, see Morse, supra note 1 3, at 1027-39 .  
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t o  suffer for the crimes they have committed does not o ffend m e .  
They suffer b ecause they deserve i t .  I t  would be better if  they did 
not have to suffer, but i t  would be better yet if they h a d  not o f­
fended the law . This is n o t  an ari el ,  theoretical belief. Rather,  i t  
goes  to the heart of what i t  means to  be a responsible p erson in a 
world that canno t  exis t  without vas t amoums of restraint  and for­
bearance to wards our fellow s .  
If sen tences are to b e  acljusted within ranges s e t  i n  p art ac­
c ording to culpability differences among defendan t s ,  fairness  re­
quires careful normative theories to tell us which fac to rs shoul d  
c o u n t  a n d  how much they should weigh in the balance.  Without 
such theories and the practical guidance they provi d e ,  the arbi­
trariness of applying differential s entencing will sweep away any 
theoretical fairnes s .  Yet lviadness and the Criminal Law lacks such 
theories and guidanc e .  For ins tance, Professor M o rris assumes,  
a s  do many o thers , that  mental abnormality ought t o  diminish 
responsibil ity . Except for once in passing,5 1 however, he does 
not explain why this should b e  so,  nor does he ever tel l  us how 
much i t  should count,  either by itself  or in relation to o th er m i ti­
gating factors . Ins tead, although Professor Morris repeatedly 
u s es the phrase " fine tuning" to characterize what s e n tencing 
j udges would d o , 52 he s eems comfortable with rough j u s tice .  H e  
s imply cannot b e  so cavalier about the actual apportioning o f  
punishment,  however. I t  i s  unsatisfactory t o  admit glibly that 
" [t] hough precise scaling o f  moral gui l t  is  far b eyon d  our capaci­
ties , a gros s  and generous weighing o f  fault  is not . "53  C o mpared 
t o  the allegedly " hazy" demands o f  equal j us tice, Profe s s o r  M or­
ris'  prescription is  downright turbi d .  If responsibility a n d  b lame­
worthiness can b e  arrayed along a finely graded continuum, and 
if  punishments within a range can b e  equally finely grade d ,  there 
must  be some s tandards for nonarbitrarily fixing s e n tences . 
Professor M orris refers to sys tems that " take gros s  account o f  
moral imperatives" as  "mature , "  but  inspecting one o f  his  favor­
i te  examples,  the Minn e s o ta S entencing Guidelines , 54 i s  n o t  com-
5 1 .  P .  1 56 (referring to the mechanisms of "understanding and self-control" in an 
aside not related to mental disorder) . 
52 .  E.g., pp. 1 59, 167, 1 68 .  
53 .  P .  1 52 .  Professor Morris also writes that " [A]ll we  can do  i s  to  develop a rough 
gradation of clemency which will permit us to take some gross account of moral imperatives . "  
P.  156 (emphasis added) . This is a hazy prescription indeed. He is clearly ambivalent 
about "fine-tuning." 
54. Pp . 172-76.  
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forting. In the abs tract ,  the Guidelines are an excellent 
expres sion o f  the theory of indeterminate sen tencing, but the ex­
amples Professor Morris provides of their actual use are chill ing 
ins tances of the arbitrary exerci se of discretion on vague 
grounds .55 Rather than providing elaborate j u s tifications for m i t­
i gation and the degree of m i tigation , many o f  the reports are s im­
ply concl u sions that  beg the q u es tion to be answered : They 
assume that m ental disorder and o ther fac tors justify mitigation,  
but  they do n o t  show why and h ow this should be done.  
I f  the law should mitigate punishment in at  lea s t  some cases ,  I 
b elieve there is  only one fair sol utio n :  one grade o f  mi tigation 
applicabl e  to all  crimes that carries a l egislatively fixed reduction 
in sentence.  I n  effect,  there would be a new verdict o f  " guilty  but 
partially responsible" that  would reflect the j ury's finding that 
the defendant committed the crime charged but that his  capacity 
for self-control or rationality was substantially compromised at 
the t ime.56  This verdict would lead to  the imposition of the fixed, 
lower s en tence. This is the most "fine tuning" that can realist i ­
cally be accomplished . I t  also has the virtue o f  enhancing equal 
treatment.  Nevertheles s ,  i t  is  n o t  the preferabl e  solution.  
I n  s um ,  Professor Morri s '  system would operate arbitrarily 
and therefore u nfairly . Alth o u gh this obj ec tion should be con­
clusive to a desert  or mixed theoris t,  the sys tem might b e  saved 
by a consequen tial is t  weighing that demons trates that the benefi­
cial s ocial o u tcome of the sys tem outweighs the unfairne s s .  I do 
n o t  believe, however, that  Professor Morris can make good on his  
p romise that consequential is t  balancing will  create a net s ocial 
gai n .  Assuming that des ert can at best provide a hierarchy o f  
ranges of n o t  undeserved s entences,  can w e  "fine tune" 
55.  Pp.  174-75. 
56. I previously proposed such a scheme as the preferred mode of dealing with the 
defense of partial responsibility produced by mental abnormality. Morse, Diminished Ca­
pacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum, 2 INT' L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 27 1, 291-96 (1979) . I f  we 
adopt partial responsibility as a defense-a position I reject-the scheme described in 
the text need not be limited to partial responsibility produced by mental abnormality. 
In  theory, partial responsibility should be available to any defendant whose responsibil­
ity or blameworthiness is nonculpably compromised for any reason.  Hence, this scheme 
could handle all cases that would reasonably justify mitigation .  A major objection to this 
scheme is that j uries are not the appropriate body to decide on mitigation by gross and 
generous weighing; the sentencing judge, it is argued, can handle this task more sensi­
bly.  For the reasons I have given, however, the judge cannot perform this task nonarbi­
trarily.  Thus, I prefer to leave the moral decision about mitigation to the body that 
decides on guil t  or innocence-the jury-and I prefer that it be performed at the high 
visibility stage of the process, the trial, rather than at the low visibility sentencing stage. 
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sen tences within the ranges in individual cases to achieve any net 
social benefi t s ?  
S ociety h a s  a lot  to do if i t  is to achieve s ocial benefits in  this 
way. Firs t ,  we need some measure of the costs o f  treating like 
cases differently.  These costs include the unfairne s s  prisoners 
experience and the unfairness observers such as myself  p erceive.  
Human lives are at  s take and u nj u s tified disparities resulting 
from imprecision are c o s tl y ,  unj u s t ,  and unaccep t ab l e .  It  is  not 
s ufficient to contend that the inevitable disparities wil l  n o t  create 
inj u s tice because all pris oners ,  whose s entences all  fal l  s ome­
where in the not undeserved range, are receiving a n o t  unde­
s erved p unishment.  I think this rationalization will be s cant 
con solation to defendants who receive sentences at  t h e  h i gh end 
o f  what promise to be very broad ran ge s , and who can fi n d  n o  
coherent normative or factual explanation for why o s tens ibly 
s imilar defendants received much lower sentences . The c o s ts of 
treating l ike cases differen tly are very high, and I h ave n o  idea 
how to measure or weigh them . I f  Professor Morris  knows how 
t o  measure these costs he is  hiding the bal l .  Second, we need 
vast amounts o f  information about the effects of p articular 
sentences or classes of sentences o n  crime rates . W h a t  p ractices 
produce how much deterrenc e ?  H ow much incapacitation of 
what percentage o f  which criminals will produce how much re­
duction in crime? Even in this era of sophis ticated quantitative 
models and computers , our knowledge remains rudimentary, al­
beit  accumulating.57 For example,  one could not c onclude that 
s elective enforcement now treats individual defe n d a n ts fairly, 
and that o n  the basis o f  present knowledge the practice wi l l  pro­
duce a net  s ocial benefit. 
The consequentialis t  weighing that Professor M orris pro­
poses is not possible .  Many o f  the most importa n t  c o s t s  cannot 
b e  measured in principle.  Factors that  p erhaps can b e  m eas ured 
in principle cannot b e  adequately measured in fac t .  The applica­
tion of mitigating and a ggravating factors accordin g  to a " gross 
and generous weighing o f  fault" will  inevitably produce arbitrary 
exercises of discretion . Professor Morris ' apparently  sensible 
sys tem simply cannot achieve i ts  supposed advantage s . 58 I prefer 
57.  See, e.g. , P.  GREENWOOD & A .  ABRAHAMSE,  SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION ( 1 982) . 
58. Professor Morris can be charmingly, disarmingly honest .  Discussing a hypo­
thetical about sentencing, he writes that in some cases he would mitigate punishment 
without giving a reason in order to achieve a result he evidently thinks is  more just. P.  
r 
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to treat l ike cases alike.  
B. i\1/adness and Punishment 
Professor M orris would allO\.v the sentencing j udge to u s e  evi­
dence of men tal disorder to decrease or in creas e sen tences 
within the not undeserved range for the crime charged.  His j u sti­
fications for doing so are n o t  u n i formly clear,  however. 
Let us  firs t  cons ider decreasing punishmen t .  Professor Mor­
ris correctly claims that decreasing the punishment of abnormal 
offen ders vvi l l  not have negative effects o n  the deterren t,  educa­
tiv e ,  or other consequen tial purposes of punishmen t .59 But the 
gravamen of his contention seems to b e  that abnormal but crimi­
nally responsible o ffenders des erve less punishment than n ormal 
o ffenders convicted of the same crime. He s imply assumes this is 
j u s tifiable and only once in passing provides a reason why this 
should b e  so-because " the pride and passion of man relate to 
his mechanisms o f  unders tanding and s elf-control . . . .  " 60 Un­
derstanding and s elf-control surely affect the assessment of 
responsibli l ty , 6 1  but why should men tal disorder be treated spe­
cial ly?  I ndeed, Professor M o rris i s  a leadin g  exponent o f  the 
view that disordered persons  s hould be held responible for their 
crimes . I f  mental disorder is  not special ,  we n eed a general the­
ory of mitigation,  instead of kindhearted but  vague s en timen ts .  
M o reover,  if  an o ffender passes the threshold level  o f  s el f-control 
and understanding necessary to be held responsible,  why s h ould 
the law consider any further differences ? 
We should note firs t that if problems with unders tandin g  and 
self-control , short of total excuse,  are t o  count at  all ,  they must 
operate at  the t ime o f  the o ffens e .  But Professor Morri s '  p o s i tion 
on this  point  is not  clear. He recognizes that  difficulties a t  the 
time of the offense should b e  considered, but apparently he also 
1 96.  This is an  honest bu t  extraordinary demonstration of the ways in which arbitrary 
results would occur because Morris '  scheme has no defensible, coherent principles that 
have clear, determinate outcomes. 
59. Pp. 154-55,  169. 
60. P. 156. The full quotation is, " Al l  we can do is to take cautious account of our 
growing through very imperfect understandings of how the pride and passions of man 
relate to his mechanisms of understanding and self-control to produce conduct . "  Else­
where, of course, Professor !1.-!orris suggests that mental disorder should have this effect 
because it exerts "undue criminogenic pressure" in some cases. Pp. 168-69. As we 
have seen, however, this rationale is fatally flawed . See notes 7-19 supra and accompany­
ing text. 
6 1. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text. 
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assumes that a deprived background or a history o f  difficulties 
should count as well.t'2 'While such a move requires a n o rmative 
theory linking life historical fac tors to the assessment of responsi­
bil i ty fo r acts ,  Professor Morris does not p rovide o n e .  
If a n  ac tor is  reas onably rational and in control a t  the t i m e  o f  
t h e  offens e ,  why should h i s  background, n o  matter how troubled 
i t  might have b een, bear on his respons ibility for the o ffe n s e ?  As 
w e  saw earlier, 6'1 it  cannot be because his unfortunate back­
ground caused his criminal b ehavi o r. Indeed,  causal factors are 
not  relevan t to assessments of responsibil ity. Since b ackground 
per se is  irrelevant to respon sibility,  however, it can n o t  be used 
to diminish (or enhance) punishment on desert  grounds . 
Al though background may be us eful  in predicting d an gerousness 
and may therefore be employed in a consequential ist  weighing of 
the proper length of incapacitation, an offender des erves n ei ther 
m ore nor less punishment b ecause of his backgrou n d .  54 
Innumerable factors can affect an offender ' s  u nd ers tanding 
and self-control at the time h e  commits a crime .  If the law were 
properly to consider the many gradations in these two behavioral 
factors , it would inquire at sentencing into the degree of rational­
i ty and s elf-control that the d efendant possessed a t  the time of 
the offense,  and adj u s t  the punishment accordingly. M e ntal dis­
o rders would occupy no special place in such an inquiry; they 
would b e  simply one factor to b e  considered. A s s e s s i n g  d egrees 
of rationality and s elf-control and nonarbitrarily a s signing pun­
ishment wi thin the range might pose insupera b l e  p ractical 
problems , but would create n o  theoretical incoherence.  
The problem with this  fin e  tuning, once again ,  i s  t h e  vision of 
p eople and the law that  i t  p resupposes . I t  treats p e o p l e  as  inca­
pable of meeting a minimum demand of civil ized s ociety :  re­
s training thems elves sufficiently to live p eaceably with o thers . 
The opposite vision-that we are all  capable of o b eying the law, 
including most mentally disordered p ersons-is b ot h  p ossible 
and more respectful ,  however. The law can consider relevant 
moral differences in the definitions of different crimes and 
defenses .  
62 .  Pp . 62,  1 68-69. 
63. See notes 1 3- 1 9  supra and accompanying text. 
64. Another reason to consider the offender's background and other factors not 
directly related to the offense is to justify granting mercy. See notes 72-78 infi'a and 
accompanying text. 
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Al though there are diffi cult  problems w i th using men tal disor­
der to decrease punishment ,  considerations of desert cause even 
greater problems when used to enhance punishmen t .  Professor 
M o rri s '  c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  argu m e n t  i s  t h eore t i c a l l y  s o u n d .  
Whether the defendan t ' s  mental disorder increas es his  dan ger­
ousness and thereby j u s tifies longer incarceration is  an empirical 
ques tion that can be ans wered by s tudies that,  by con trol l ing for 
o ther factors , al low the independent con tribution of mental dis­
order to dangerousness to  emerge . Professor Morris would not 
allow the presence of men tal disorder to enhance punishment 
unless such an independent contribution to dangerousness could 
be demons trated.65 This is  precisely the ri ght appro ach . But 
since the best  evidence demons trates that mental disorder per se 
rarely if  ever enhances dangerousness,66 Morris ' sys tem would 
not allow consequentiali s t-based enhancemen t .  
Professor Morris would al low enhancement o f  punishment,  
however, because " desert i tself may be condi tioned by fear, and 
the mentally i l l  may properly or improperly be m ore feared in 
relation to criminal behavior than those who are n o t  mentally 
i l l .  "67 Professor M orris further explains that :  
The societal face of  a deserved punishment expresses fear of  
the criminal among other sentiments . Irrational behavior that 
is not easily explained o r  is seen as out of  control tends to be 
more feared than similar behavior that  is thought to be planned 
and rationally controlled.  And that those fears help to define 
the deserved punishment . . . requires no analysis ;  brief intro­
spection in which one empathizes with the victim suffices . . . . 
But clearly, being generative of irrational fear, the criminal 's 
mental  i l lness  tends s o metimes towards increas ing h is  
punishment. 58 
C o ntrary to Professor M orri s '  bl ithe assertion,  however, these 
propositions are hardly clear and require carefu l  analysi s .  
Putting aside considerations o f  mental disorder for a m o ­
ment, what does i t  mean t o  s a y  that criminals w h o  provoke 
greater fear deserve greater punishment ?  Our fear is  certainly 
65. Pp. 1 7 1-72.  
66. Monahan & S teadman, supra note 1 7. Professor Morris claims that one can 
cautiously conclude that certain mental disorders increase the base expectancy rate for 
certain categories of crime. P. 1 64. Except when referring in general, and without cita­
tion, to " two s treams of research," he cites no evidence to support this conclusion and, 
to the best of my knowledge, no reliable and valid studies to support it  are available. 
67. P. 1 6 1 .  
68 .  Pp. 1 6 1 -62.  
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greater of those who commit more serious , or fears o m e ,  cri m e s ,  
a n d  this is  reflected already in t h e  rank ordering of the seri o u s ­
n e s s  of crimes a n d  punishments . S imilarly,  w e  fear m ore those 
who commit crimes in particularly fears ome ways . Thu s ,  i t  m akes 
sense to say that a criminal  des erves more punishm ent b ecause 
he has done s omething m ore heinous than someone who com­
mitted the same crime in a less  fears ome fashion . 69 
Professor Morris does n o t  s eem to have either o f  these two 
cases in mind, h owever. What he is apparently referrin g  to is  the 
case of an especially dangerous type of criminal who, because of 
his prior record or some o th er factor, is  l ikely to o ffend again.  
I ncreas ing such a criminal ' s  punishment on cons equentiali s t  
grounds is  l o g·ical , but  h e  d o e s  n o t  deserve more punishmen t . 70 
H e  has n o t  done anything worse than another defendant accused 
o f  the same crime; he is  being punished for who he is  rather than 
for what he has done. This i s  a s trange meaning o f  desert that I 
doubt even Professor Morris would accept .  7 1 
Professor M orri s '  pro b l em b ecomes even grea ter when we 
consider the role o f  men tal diso rder in producing fear.  Assume 
either that  a crazy person commits a crime in a scary w ay o r  that  a 
defendant arguably deserves more punishment becaus e  h e  is a 
scary type of p erson.  I t  s imply does n o t  follow that s o m e  men­
tally disordered people deserve heightened punishment because 
they are especially frightening. The reas on is  that the cause of 
their frightening irrationality-mental disorder-is beyond their 
control . Professor Morris accep ts this claim by contending that 
mental disorder decreases desert.  H e  bases this con tention on 
the assumption that  irrationality is  n o t  the fault  o f  t h e  mentally 
disordered.  He cannot have it b o th ways ,  however. If mentally 
disordered people are p o werless to prevent their fearsomeness ,  
69 .  This could be dealt with by proper definitions of crimes rather than by adjus t­
ments in sentencing. 
70. Some theorists have tried to justify recidivist s tatutes on desert grounds.  See, 
e.g. , von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REv. 59 1 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
I find these arguments unpersuasive. I f  a person has already received the deserved pun­
ishment for what he has done, I do not see why the commission of a past crime should 
enhance his deserved punishment for further deeds. 
7 1 .  Professor Morris never addresses whether desert justifies considering a crimi­
nal ' s  prior criminal record at sentencing. In making his case for anisonomy, however, he 
assumes in order to clarify the issues that such a jus tification exis ts .  Pp. 1 84-86. The 
tenor of the discussion leads me to believe that he rejects the justifications given, p. 1 85,  
and would rely on his  own scheme solely on the ground that creating fear produces 
greater desert. See p. 1 63 .  
J 
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o ne cannot claim that they des erve increased punishment for i t .  
Profes sor Morri s '  reference t o  empathy wi th the victim a s  a 
gro und for desert -based enhancement is a final logical gaffe. 
One might emp athize with the v ictim of a rabid dog's attack,  but 
that empathy , and fear o f  the dog, hardly lead to the conclusion 
that the dog " des erves " punishmen t .  I t  should be cured or de­
stroyed, of course, but not  because i t  is  morally at  fault .  
Thu s ,  Professor M orris must  rely on consequential ist  argu­
ments for increasing punishment on the basis of fear, especially 
wh ere the fears o meness is  a product of mental dis order. 
C .  lvfercy 
Mercy is Norval Morris '  " fudge factor, " argued for at  vari o us 
s tages of the exposi tion . 72 I t  is the most  mys tifying part of  the 
book because Morris never tells us what mercy is  and under what 
conditions it should be gran ted. He quotes approvingly from a 
recent papal encyclical that movingly say s ,  i n  effect, that j u s tice 
should be tempered by mercy. 7 3  When this s ort of  pronounce­
ment comes from the Pope, i t  does not cause any problems,  but 
when a criminal l awyer asks us  to  adopt i t  as a guiding principle, 
w e  are entitled to ask for more than uplifting sentiments . 
What is mercy ? I t  is not  the decrease in punishment that fol­
lows from a finding that  an offender deserves less  punishment or 
that a lesser punishment will create a social  gain, although all  of 
Professor Morris '  examples are of this s tandard s ort .  Consulting 
the philosophical l i terature does not  provide definitional and 
conceptual clarification of the term "mercy. "74 As important as 
the topic seems to be,  the l i terature is  sparse, and s cholars rarely 
agree. Nor is  much of the l i terature s ufficiently specific to help 
practical persons like Professor Morris ,  who wish to affect deci­
s ionmakers . All that remains is  the commonsensical notion that 
to exercise mercy is  to decrease a person ' s  punishment or suffer­
ing beyond what the usual desert or consequentiali s t  j u s tifica­
tions would dictate; we punish less because we feel s orry for the 
person being punished . Professor M orris claims that there i s  a 
7 2 .  E.g. , pp.  1 55-60.  My discussion addresses those pages unless otherwise noted. 
73. P. 1 56.  
74 . See, e.g. , Card , On Mercy, 81 PHIL.  REv. 1 82 ( 1 972) ;  Smart, Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345 
( 1 968) ;  Sterba, Can a Penon Deserve Mercy ?, 10  J .  Soc. P H I L .  1 1  ( 1 9 79) . See also Hes­
tevold, Dts;tmclive Desert, 20 AM. PI·IIL. Q 357, 36 1 -62 ( 1 983) (exercise of mercy must be 
arbitrary) . 
1 508 STANFORD Ll ! V  REVIE W [Vol . 3 6 :  1 485  
" compelling need fo r mercy i n  all human relationships,  b u t  m o s t  
particularly in t h e  relationship where t h e  s ocial collectivity is  i m ­
p o sing punishment on the wrongdoer. "75  Even assuming t h a t  he 
is  correct on this  point,  however, can the law properly express 
the need for merc y ?  
Professor M orris asks , " I f  we a l l  g o t  o u r  j us t  deserts , w h o  e s ­
capes the rack ? " 76 He claims that a n  absolu tely evenhanded s y s ­
t e m  that punishes legally alike cases alike would be far harsher 
than our present system . H e  con tends that al though i t  would be 
theoretically pos sible to have mercifully lenien t,  legisla tively 
fixed punishments fo r individual crimes , i t  w ould be i m p ossible  
in such a sys tem to be merciful in individual cases becau s e  n o  one 
would es cape punishment.  M o reover, Professor M o rris correctly 
believes that legis latures are unlikely to make determinate 
sen tences merciful . Rather,  they are inclined to make fixed terms 
quite hars h .  Thu s ,  if the burden o f  the criminal j u s tice sys tem 
currently falls disproportionately on the underprivileged and mi­
n o rities,  i t  would be even grea ter under a determinate sentencing 
scheme in which everybody got his  or her fixed (and p robably 
harsh)  just  deserts . 7 7  Professor M o rris argues that a sys tem that 
allows for individual dispensations o f  mercy would cause less  net  
suffering to disadvantaged pers o n s ,  even if mercy were not dis­
pensed evenhandedly.  He reaches what I believe is a vas t ly  over­
s tated conclusion:  A society that punishes without parsimony 
and clemency " creates an intolerable engine o f  tyran ny . " 7 8  
Professor M o rris confuses parsimony a n d  mercy . R ed u cing 
sentences for cons equentialist  o r  desert reasons is  not the exer­
cise o f  mercy . Furthermore, why i s  a sys tem that punishes all 
those who deserve it " an in tolerable engine o f  tyran ny " ?  Punish­
ment should n o t  be unfairly harsh ,  b u t  i t  is  n o t  unfair t o  punish 
j u s tly  a defendan t who has been fairly convicted o f  an offense.  
Professor Morris apparently assumes that there i s  s omething 
wro n g  wi th punishing the guilty .  I ,  o n  the o ther han d ,  wish we 
were able to punish them m o re often . I simply do not s hare Pro-
75 .  P. 1 55 .  
7 6 .  !d. 
7 7 .  Some have argued against determinate sentences on the ground that the legis­
lature can easily make the scheme harsher simply by increasing the penalties. This argu­
ment proves too much, however. A legislature can easily increase both ends of  the not 
undeserved range, and, if Professor Morris is correct about the legislative tendency to­
wards harshness ,  it would be quite likely to do so. 
78.  P. 155. 
r 
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fessor M o rris '  assumption that deserving offenders should not be 
punished because punishment hurts . The purpose of retrib utive 
punishment is precisely to cause those who des erve punishment 
to suffer proportionately.  The re is no intolerable tyranny in such 
a system. 79 
Finally, Professor Morris is  so  worried about the harshness o f  
a pure j u s t  deserts system that he claims that discretion mus t be 
retained . We have already seen that there are vast  and inevitable 
p roblems o f  arbitrariness if we try to exercise discretion on 
grounds o f  either desert or u ti l i ty .  Th e standards for exercising 
dis cretion on these grounds are extraordinarily precise,  h owever, 
compared to the s tandards that would guide Professor M o rris ' 
exercise of mercy. Indeed, as Professor M o rris recognizes,  d is ­
cretion would probably be exercised most  unfavorably with re­
gard to disadvantaged person s .  Moreover, suppose,  contrary to 
the experience of the past two decades , increased numbers o f  
" l a w  and o rder" j udges were appointed t o  t h e  trial bench . S uch 
j udges would be unfavorably disposed to granting mercy and 
would sentence defendants consistently to the high ends of the 
ranges . 
A regime o f  broad ranges o f  penalties i n  which j udges were 
charged with exercising mercy in appropriate cases would be one 
o f  "no h olds barred" arbitrarines s .  The law cannot engage i n  
s uch a n  enterprise without compromising its  l e gi timacy. I f  t h e  
need for mercy i s  compelling, then mercy must  b e  exercised pri­
vately, driven by generosity o f  the soul.  Granting m ercy canno t  
b e  the law's busines s ,  and Profes s o r  M o rris provides n o  guide­
lines to convince us that i t  should be.  
D .  Defining Crimes and justice: "The Brothel Boy " Reconsidered 
Professor Morris denies the law's ability to define crimes and 
defenses with sufficient moral and legal precis ion to j u s ti fy pun­
ishing those convicted of the same crime alike.  H e  therefore sug­
gests ranges o f  n o t  undeserved sentences and must  accept all the 
problems they create.  I believe, however, that crimes and de­
fenses can be defined with sufficient precision morally to s upport 
equal punishment .  Careful attention to mens rea,  relevant cir-
79. One might argue that the intolerably inhumane conditions in many of our jails 
and prisons produces the tyranny complained of. If the unfairness of exposing prison­
ers to such conditions, rather than the theoretically just grounds for punishment, is what 
is really at s take, society should confront this problem directly. 
1 5 1 0  ST"1NFORD LA W  REVIE W [Vol .  36 :  1 485  
cums tances , a n d  j u s tifying a n d  excusing condi tions c a n  capture 
the important moral differences among criminals that the law 
should recognize. O ther differences in personal characteristics 
and circum s tances are real  but not  legally importa n t .  N o  matter 
how precis ely crimes and defenses are defined, o f  cours e, there 
will occasionally be substantial differences in culpability b etween 
two defendants convicted of the same relatively precis ely defined 
crime.  In such cases , p unishing the same will create,  o r  appear to 
create, inj u s tice.  Less inj u s tice wil l  result, however, than the ar­
bitrary exercise of discretion that Professor M o rris '  s y s te m  inevi­
tably will  produce. 
Professor Morris provides an excellent example of my thesis 
in his opening chapter,  "The Brothel Boy," a s hort s to ry that de­
picts the tension between m oral guilt  and legal guilt  and consid­
ers the role of mercy in punishment. M orris deftly,  if  a b i t  
academically, tells a tale o f  crime a n d  punishment  set  in rural 
Burma under the Raj .80 In brief, a girl of twelve or thirteen i s  
killed w h e n  she acciden tally h i t s  h e r  h ead on a r o c k  w h i l e  b eing 
raped by the brothel boy,  a somewhat retarded m a n  o f  twenty. 
The son o f  a pro s ti tute and an unknown father, the b r o thel b o y  
had been brought up i n  t h e  l ocal brothel,  where h e  earned h i s  
meager keep by operating t h e  punkah , a type o f  fan .  W h e n  M or­
ris/Orwell,  the assistant p olice superintenden t ,  interviews him 
about the crime, al l  h e  says , repetitively, is ,  " Please s ir ,  I paid,  
I ' m  sorry sir. " The questions the story rais es are whether the 
brothel b o y  is  l egally and morally guilty, and what punishment he 
deserves.  
M orris/Orwell argues s trenuously with his  frie n d ,  Dr.  Veras­
wami, that  the boy is  c loser to innocence than most  of  u s ;  his  
squalid b ackground and l o w  intelligence have conspired to rob 
him of responsibility and guilt .  Although he admits  that i t  i s  hard 
to develop coherent principles to guide the dispensation o f  
mercy, M orris/Orwell b elieves that this is  clearly a case  for dis­
pensing mercy. Veraswami vociferou s ly disagree s .  H e  argu e s  
that t h e  b o y  knew w h a t  he was doing even if his  comprehension 
was clouded by his weak i ntelligence and background.  He must 
therefore be treated as  a responsible p erson and hanged . Grant-
80. "The Brothel Boy" mimics and incorporates two of George Orwell's early au­
tobiographical fictional essays. See Orwell, A Hanging, in I THE CoLLECTED EssAYS, 
joURNALISM AND LETTERS O F  GEORGE ORWELL 70 (S. Orwell & I. Angus eds. 1 968) ;  Shoot­
ing an Elephant, in id. at 235.  
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ing mercy is  a task best  l eft to the deity.  Al though Dr.  Veraswami 
is sympathetic to the boy, he views the task of the law as j u s tice, 
not mercy , and here j ustice requires the noos e . 8 1  I n  the end,  the 
b ro thel boy hangs . 
Despite Dr.  Veraswami 's  conten tions , the reader i s  clearly 
meant to sympathize with the brothel boy, to conclude that he is 
n o t  ful ly  responsible for the girl ' s  death , and to feel revolted by 
the capital punishment.  The result appears unj us t ,  or  at  the very 
least ,  the case s eems to demand the dispensation of mercy. The 
lesson of the story is  that l egal guilt and its prede termined pun­
ishments create unfair results . 
I wish to commit a nasty deed upon Profes sor Morri s '  art-to 
treat his story as an examination hypo thetical . I shall  consider 
the s tory in the ligh t  of s tandard, modern homicide analysis ,  
without redefining the law . If i nj u s tice was done,  it  is  n o t  primar­
ily b ecause l egal and moral guilt  are in tension and mercy was 
improp erly withheld; rather, the brothel boy was improperly con­
victed of a crime he did not commit. Professor M orris has 
s tacked the deck by manipulating our responses to the brothel 
boy.  
The brothel b oy did not ki l l  the girl intentionally o r  reck­
less ly .  She hit her head accidentally while being raped.  If the 
brothel b oy is  to be believed, he was not consciously aware that 
he was risking her death. At most ,  the n ,  he is  gui lty of s ome form 
of n egligent homicide, say, involuntary mans laughter, which typi­
cally carries very light penalties . Would a short term of imprison­
ment appear to be such an unfair punishment for the brothel 
boy's  deed? 
Criminal lawyers might argue that the brothel boy committed 
felony murder; raping the girl s upplied the underlying felony 
that  caused her death . O f  course,  felony murder i s  a form of 
8 1 .  Veraswami also argues that the assistant superintendant must hang the boy 
because that i s  what both the British and the Burmese expect from a British official. 
This consequentialist argument based on role expectations is derived from Orwell ' s  ob­
servations in Shooting an Elephant, supra note 80. There, Orwell wrote that as an officer in 
the Indian Imperial Police he felt compelled to destroy a valuable elephant that  had run 
amok and killed a man. Although the elephant was calm and it was unnecessary to kill it, 
the vil lagers expected him to do so because his role required it. He killed the elephant. 
It is impossible to know whether this incident actually happened to Orwell as he 
described it in the essay. This is a problem with much of Orwell's seemingly  autobio­
graphical writing. B. CRICK, GEORGE ORWELL: A LIFE 26,  1 66 ( l 980) . This is why I refer 
to the essay as an "autobiographical fictional essay ."  
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s trict l iabi l i ty that t h e  British abolished in 1 9 5 782 a n d  t h a t  Ameri­
can j uris dictions have res tricted or abolished becau s e  of the un­
fairness of the pri s tine rul e .83  The primary o bj ec tion to 
punishing the brothel boy for felo ny murder is that i t  i s  unfair to 
punish anyone s everely for a s trict l iabi l i ty cri m e .  M oreover, the 
brothel boy may not even b e  guil ty of felony murder.  One of the 
elements of the underlying felony of  rape is  that the d efendant 
knew, i n tended, or,  at  the very least ,  was aware of a ris k  that  the 
victim did not consen t .  Here, for various reasons ,  the brothel 
b oy app aren tly believed that the victim was a pros titute who was 
not really resistin g.84 I am more inclined to believe this claim 
than the allegations of the defendants in the infamous l'v!organ 
case,85 who claimed that they hones tly bel ieved the resist ing vic­
t im consented to their vi le atten tions . Thu s ,  i t  is poss ible  tha t  the 
brothel b oy is  not gui l ty of rap e or felony murder unless the cru­
cial m ental element in  rape is ,  at  most,  n egligence.  But such a 
harsh mens rea rule contrasts s tarkly with the m od ern trend to­
wards subj ective l iabil ity,  and Professor Morris properly rej ec ts 
i t .  86 
82.  Homicide Act, 1 957 ,  5 & 6 Eliz .  2, ch. l l ,  § 1 ( 1 ) .  
8 3 .  California, for instance, developed a very rich set of l imitations.  See People v .  
Ireland, 70 Cal .  2d 522, 450 P .2d 580, 75 Cal . Rptr. 1 88 ( 1 969) (merger rule) ; People v .  
Phil lips , 64 Cal .  2d 574, 4 1 4 P .2d 353 ,  5 1  Cal .  Rptr. 225  ( 1 966) (felony murder l imited 
to underlying felonies that are "inherently dangerous" ) ;  People v. Washington, 62  Cal .  
2d  777 ,  402 P .2d 1 30 ,  44 Cal. Rptr. 442 ( 1 965) (ki l l ing must be committed by the felon 
or an accomplice) . 
84. Conceivably, a jurisdiction that employs the artificial and confusing dis tinction 
between specific and general intent might exclude the evidence that mens rea was absent 
on the ground that rape is a g,·neral intent crime and evidence of mental abnormality is 
not admissible to negate general intent. Moreover, some jurisdictions prohibit the ad­
mission of evidence of mental abnormality to negate the mens rea of any crime. See 
S tate v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St .  2d  1 82 ,  436 N .E.2d 523 ( 1 982 ) .  Such l imiting rules are 
totally misguided and perhaps unconstitutional; Professor Morris rightly rejects them. 
Pp.  65, 70. A full discussion of these points i s  presented i.n Morse, supra note 3, at  5-7 , 
1 5- 1 6. 
85. Regina v. Morgan, 1976 A.C.  1 82 (H.L. ) .  Later legislation made clear that rape 
could be committed if the defendant was reckless about consent.  Sexual Offenses 
(Amendment) Act, 1 976, ch. 82, § 1 ( l  ). Recklessness is clearly a subjective mens rea, 
however. 
86. P. 7 1 .  Modern criminal law doctrine, as exemplified by the l'v!odel Penal Code, 
increasingly bases blameworthiness and criminal liability on a defendant's actual, subjec­
tive mental state. See also note 85 supra . This trend has generated s ignificant debate, 
however. See Temkin,  The Limits of Reckless Rape, 1 983 CRIM.  L. REv. 5 ;  Wells ,  Swatting the 
Subjectivist Bug, 1 982 CRIM. L. REv. 209. Moreover, there is an argument that the British 
have retreated somewhat from the broad "subjectivism" of Morgan .  See Cowley, The Re­
treat from Morgan, 1 982 CRIM. L. REv. 1 98 (decrying the retreat) . See generally Smith, 
Subjective or Objective ? Ups and Downs of the Test of Cn'minal Liability m England, 27 VILL. L. 
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\V e can even go one s tep further. I f  the bro thel b o y ' s  in telli­
gence was sufficien tly low, conceivably he knew neither o f  the n a ­
ture and quality o f  his act  (was it  in tercourse with a pro s ti tute or 
rap e o f  an innocent s tranger?) nor that i t  was wrong.  Th u s ,  he 
migh t  have been totally exonera ted, albeit  then to face a fa te 
w o r s e  than prison and perhaps worse than the noose- lifelong 
com mitment to a B urmese mental  hospital . Of course,  since Pro­
fes s o r  l\J orris would abolish the insanity defense,  this p o s s ibil i ty 
would n o t  be available t o  the brothel boy in Morri s '  refo rmed,  
"mercifu l "  system. 
Professor M o rris further clouds the iss ues by imposing capital 
punishment on the brothel boy. Even if, contrary to my analys is ,  
the bro thel boy could be convicted o f  the highest degree o f  mur­
der, i t  is unlikely that he would be execu ted . The British have 
abolished capital punishment,  and even in the Uni ted S ta tes the 
sentencing authority must consider all  miti gating factors .87  
Moreover, many s tate capi tal punishment s tatu tes specifically 
provide that mental defect i s  a mitigating factor.88 Professor 
l\�lorris might coun ter that my rej ection o f  disparate s entences for 
the same crime precludes m e  from arguing for mitigatio n  o n  be­
half of the brothel boy. But capital punishment is  improper for 
any crime.  Imposing capital punishment is  s imply a distract ion in 
this case ,  for no fair modern sys tem would convict the bro thel  
b o y  o f  capital murder in  the firs t place.  
I t  was unj u s t  to hang the brothel  boy,  b u t  n o t  becaus e  mercy 
should have mitigated the rigors o f  the allegedly condign punish­
ment for murder. The brothel boy should have received a much 
lesser penalty because h e  was guil ty only o f  a much lesser 
crime. 89 And Professor M orris could n o t  rej ec t  this analysis be-
REv. I I  79  ( 1 982) (arguing for the subjectivist view) . Nevertheless, except for the  reten­
tion of the felony murder doctrine, liability is increasingly subjective in the United 
States , and the British retreat is insubstantial . See W.(A Minor) v .  Dolbey, 1 983 CRIM.  L. 
REV. 68 1 .  
87.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U .S .  586 ( 1 978) . Furthermore, if the brothel boy could be 
convicted of felony murder, it is likely, although not certain, that the death penalty could 
not be constitutionally applied to him. Enmund v .  Florida, 458 U.S. 782 ( 1 982)  (holding 
that the death penalty cannot be applied to a felony murderer who killed entirely 
accidentally) . 
88.  E.g., CAt.. PENAL CoDE § 1 90 .3 (h) (Deering 1 984) . 
89. The brothel boy would most l ikely be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, but if 
the jurisdiction requires subjective liability for that crime, he might not be guilty of  any 
form of homicide. He might be guilty of battery if that crime could be committed 
negligentlY .  
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cause elsewhere he prescribes j u s t  this sort of careful attention to 
mens rea z,s a proper substi tute for the insanity defens e . 90 
Nor must we accept Burmese conditions and Bri t i s h  law as 
they were then . Tensions be tween moral guilt  and legal  guil t  can 
b e  resolved in two ways : by gran ting mercy when l egal guilt  is  
too harsh, or by reforming the law to avoid unj us t  attri b u tions  o f  
gui l t  and punishment . I t  i s  preferable t o  try the latter approach 
first because definitions of crimes and defenses should accurately 
and specifically reflect our attributions o f  blameworthines s .  I f  
the criminal law is  to maintain respect, w e  cannot p o s tp o n e  a t­
tri buting blameworthiness until  s entencing. 
Sensible definitions of crimes that pay careful atten tion to 
mens rea and specific circumstances , coupled with a humane ar­
ray o f  defenses,  will  allow the law to distinguish m orall y  dis tinct  
cases . This  approach clearly works in the case of "The Bro thel 
B o y . "  Differences will  still exist  among offenders and the ways 
they commit their crimes ,  but for purposes of the law, o ffenders 
will be sufficien tly morally alike to j u s tify equal punishment .  This  
wi l l  n o t  be a perfect solution,  but the law cannot  achieve perfec­
tion .  If like cases are trea ted alike, however, this is a good s tart .  
I I I .  CoNCLUSION 
l'v!adness and the Criminal Law is a major j urisprudential  s tate­
ment o f  the proper contours of criminal responsibil ity and pun­
ishment and their relationship to mental disorder. It  forces all  
concerned with these problems to reexamine their a s s u m p tions 
and recommendati o n s .  Although a theoretical book,  i t  consist­
ently emphasizes the practical problems that theory should in­
form . 9 1  In this review, I have concentrated on those aspects  of 
the book that seem most problematic .  This approach necess arily 
and unfortunately i gnores the many i s sues about which I b elieve 
90. E.g. , pp.  65-67 ,  70-72 .  I t  may seem that my analysis of mens rea supports 
Professor Morris '  argument for abolishing the insanity defense. But it  does not do so 
for at least two reasons. First ,  the case presents a highly unusual and artificial ins tance 
in which mens rea is substantially negated. Although this is possible in theory, in prac­
tice it virtually never happens . Morse,  supra note 3, at 38-44 .  The reason the brothel 
boy presents such a s trong case for mitigation is precisely that his abnormality vitiates 
his subjective mens rea, the proper touchstone of culpability. Second, as I have been 
arguing, if the brothel boy is sufficiently mentally abnormal, he should not be convicted 
of any crime at all because it  is unjust to hold him responsible. 
� 9 1 .  On the other hand, Professor Morris often resorts to practical problems when­
ever a theoretical argument fails. This is perhaps most evident in his discussion of  the 
insanity defense. 
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Professor M orris is exactly righ t .  N everthel ess ,  he invites his  
readers to engage in debate with him, and i t  would b e  disrespect­
ful to do o therwise .  N o  commen tator on cri m e  and madness de­
s erves our attention m o re than h e .  
